NJ Case Law - State v. Moran

Nature of Case
Statutory challenge based on legislative repeal, vagueness, overbreadth, and due process.

Facts
Moran drove through a light while going around two stopped cars through a “left turn only” lane. Moran approached at a high rate of speed while the light was still red and Officer Peter, who witnessed the incident, testified that had the light not turned green Moran would not have been able to stop in time. Officer Peter’s testimony was undisputed and was found credible by both the municipal and law division judges.

Procedural History
Defendant was found guilty in municipal court of reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96. In addition to a fine and costs, the municipal judge imposed a forty-five day driver's license suspension pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5-31. On appeal, Moran challenged her reckless driving conviction and also challenged the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 39:5-31. The Law Division judge found no constitutional infirmity and again found defendant guilty of reckless driving. Defendant now appeals

Issue:
Whether the evidence is sufficient to uphold a reckless driving conviction where there is undisputed testimony from an officer that defendant would have ran a red light if it had not turned green at the last moment and that she did so by going around two stopped cars and going through the light from a “left turn only” lane?

Whether N.J.S.A. 39:5-31 should be vacated because it is antiquated, unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, provides insufficient notice to the public, and gives judges unbridled discretion?


Holding
Affirmed. Officer Peter’s undisputed testimony is sufficient evidence to uphold Moran’s conviction. There was no constitutional infirmity.

Rationale
First, the statute has not been replaced by the new point system because the two provisions can “harmoniously co-exist.” The judicial branch cannot repeal the acts of the legislature by mere implication of legislature’s intent. Twp. of Mahwah v. Bergen Co. Bd. of Taxation, 98 N.J. 268, 281, 486 A.2d 818, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1136, 105 S.Ct. 2677, 86 L.Ed.2d 696 (1985). Where two provisions can co-exist, the judicial branch cannot imply that the legislature intended to repeal one of the provisions.

Second, defendant’s overbreadth challenge fails because driving is a privilege and not a constitutionally protected right. Defendant’s vagueness challenge fails because for a statute to be vague, defendant must prove that it prescribes nothing with sufficient certainty or it is vague as it applies to defendant. The license suspension statute provides that such a penalty is available for any “willful violation … [in the] subtitle as shall, in the discretion of the magistrate, justify such a revocation.” N.J.S.A. 39:5-31 prescribes with sufficient certainty that the penalty is available for willful violations because “people would not be unsure as to whether or not their conduct falls under [willful].” Nor is it vague in its application to Moran’s conviction because “willful” is an element of the offense for which N.J.S.A. 39:5-31 penalty was added.

Third, the statute provides fair notice of the possible license suspension despite it being in a different chapter from the reckless driving charge. The reckless driving offense and penalties are located in Chapter 4 and the license suspension penalty is in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, every person is presumed to know the law.

“It is an established rule of statutory construction that a statute written in general terms will be given prospective application to situations unknown or nonexistent at the time of its enactment which are within its general purview and scope where the language fairly includes them.” Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 41 N.J. 467, 477, 197 A.2d 366, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 14, 85 S.Ct. 144, 13 L.Ed.2d 84 (1964). Since N.J.S.A 39:5-31 was enacted before the reckless driving offense for which defendant is being punished, the penalty must be reviewed for an abuse of discretion by the municipal court. In determining whether to invoke N.J.S.A. 39:5-31, and in determining the length of such a suspension, consideration should be given to:

The nature and circumstances of the present offense and whether it was particularly egregious; any harm inflicted on others; the defendant's driving record, considering how long the defendant has been a licensed driver and the seriousness, frequency, and timing of prior infractions; the likelihood of committing further motor vehicle violations; the need for deterrence; whether there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct, though failing to establish a defense; whether this was the defendant's first violation or whether he or she had gone for a substantial period of time without violations prior to the present offense; whether the defendant's character and attitude indicate that he or she is unlikely to commit another motor vehicle violation (or at least a willful one); and the like. With respect to the length of the suspension, courts may also consider the length of suspensions authorized for specific offenses in the Motor Vehicle Code as a basis for comparison and proportionality.

Since the municipal judge based the suspension on the prior record of Moran, he did not abuse his discretion.

Notes:
The court added that the use of N.J.S.A. 39:5-31 as a “trial tax” to coerce pleas or routine use of it in certain categories of offenses as a matter of standard policy is improper. The court also noted “it would indeed be sensible for the Legislature to consider amending [the statute] to include limitations and guidelines.”

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