NJ Case Law - State v. Tsetsekas

Nature of Case
Appeal from a DWI conviction based on a denial of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial

Facts
On May 8, 2007, defendant Tsetsekas was involved in a single car accident. Officer Rubino charged Tsetsekas with a DWI for which he was later convicted. Tsetsekas first appeared on May 15th, 2007 and pleaded not guilty. His trial was scheduled for July 17th, 2007. On that date, the Stated requested an adjournment because the prosecutor had only recently responded to the defense’s discovery requests. The judge noted that the prosecution was now beyond its 60 day guideline and rescheduled the trial for August 14th, 2007. On August 14th, the prosecution informed the court that they had not sent a videotape from the police car and that they needed another 30-60 days to obtain the tape. The trial judge granted the prosecutions request but asked that the tape request be expedited because they were beyond the 60 day guideline. The trial dates were rescheduled two more times on September 14th and October 9th because the tape had no been received and the trial was rescheduled to November 13th, 2007. On that date, the prosecution stated that the tape was not reviewed and that because they were discussing a plea bargain, the prosecution had not subpoenaed Officer Rubino. The prosecution also acknowledged that the test certificate for the breathalyzer had not been produced. The next trial date, December 4th, was rescheduled on the account of a death in Rubino’s family. On December 18th, the prosecution’s witnesses were not in court when the case was called. The defense objected to the prosecution’s request for a recess. Nevertheless, the court recessed and heard the matter two hours later. One witness was still missing and court rescheduled trial for March 5th, 2008. On April 16th, the prosecution concluded the presentation of its evidence and defendant was found guilty of DWI.

Procedural History
In denying defendant's argument that the delay denied him a speedy trial, the Law Division considered the fact that the matter was adjourned “at least seven times” and required “more than ten appearances[,][a]ll because the State was not prepared.” However, the court concluded the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not denied, determining the delay was not “purposeful” and the prejudice suffered by defendant was not extensive. Following de novo review of the municipal court record, defendant was convicted of DWI and sentenced just as he was in municipal court. This appeal ensued.

Issue: Whether the delay in a DWI trial infringed on defendant’s due process right to a speedy trial where the prosecution was not prepared for proceed seven times, the trial was delayed for almost a year, and the prosecution was not aware that the witnesses became unavailable until the time of their appearance?

Holding
Reversed and dismissed.

Rationale
The United States Supreme Court announced a four-part test to determine when a delay infringes upon a defendant's due process rights. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972). Courts must consider and balance the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. The factors are interrelated and each must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Id. In his opinion, the law division judge eluded to the fact that the municipal courts are part-time courts and relied on State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. 425, 429, 727 A.2d 501, 503 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), a case involving a two year delay. This was improper. First, this was not a part-time court. Second, there is no set time for when the delay becomes improper. Instead, the courts need to constantly strive to meet the 60-day guideline set by the Supreme Court. In considering the second prong of the Barker test, the court needs to consider the culpability for the delay. In this case, the prosecution is at fault for all of the delays. A significant consideration was that the prosecution did not find out about the unavailability of its witness until its scheduled appearance and the proceedings had to be delayed. Further, the breathalyzer administrator did not show up at all. Allowing such broad leeway to either party would reduce their incentive to come prepared. The third prong was met in this case because the defense asserted timeliness when it became an issue. The fourth prong, prejudice to the defendant, may be satisfied with "employment interruptions, public obloquy, anxieties concerning the continued and unresolved prosecution, the drain on finances, and the like." State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. 425, 446, 727 A.2d 501, 515 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). In this case, prejudice to the defendant was satisfied through anxiety, employment interruptions, and a drain on finances.



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